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Parliament’s Role Following Declarations of 
Incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 
Jeff King * 
HE HUMAN RIGHTS Act 1998 (HRA) has been called ‘the cornerstone of the 
New Constitution’ 1  and even ‘one of the most important pieces of 
legislation to be enacted in the twentieth century’. 2  As is well known, 
however, UK courts have no power to strike down a statute on account of it 
violating the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the ‘Convention’), 
which the HRA effectively makes the UK’s bill of rights. Rather, if a UK court cannot 
‘so far as possible’ read a UK statute consistently with Convention rights under 
section 3, they repair to section 4(2): ‘If the court is satisfied that the provision is 
incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that 
incompatibility.’ Furthermore, section 4(6) of the HRA confirms that any such 
declaration ‘does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the 
provision in respect of which it is given; and … is not binding on the parties to the 
proceedings in which it is made’.  
Thus far, UK courts have issued 20 such section 4 declarations that were not 
overturned on appeal,3 and the purpose of this chapter is to explore the practice of the 
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1 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) ch 3. 
2 J Stanton, ‘Review: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act—By Alison L Young’ 
(2010) 30 Legal Studies 689, 689. 
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constant citation in the text. As of June 2014, the cases include (with numbering added for 
convenience): (1) R(H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for the North and East of London Region, 
and the Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWCA Civ 415; (2) McR’s Application for Judicial 
Review [2002] NIQB 58; (3) International Transport Roth GmBH v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 158; (4) 
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UK courts under this system, how that compares with some experiences abroad, how 
Parliament has responded to such declarations, and what it all says about the nature and 
constitutional role of the remedial scheme for the judicial review of legislation set out in the 
HRA. More particularly, I will shed preliminary light on the answers to the following set of 
questions: 
 What form have parliamentary and governmental responses to section 4 
declarations taken, how promptly and what kind of policies were enacted in 
response? 
 Does the HRA promote or hinder democratic deliberation about rights in 
Parliament? 
 Is there an emerging constitutional convention that the Government and 
Parliament4 are constitutionally obligated to respond to section 4 declarations 
by amending the offending legislation? 
The preliminary answers to such questions do not all fit into a simple conceptual 
scheme bearing a headline message. The evidence is mixed. We must also be mindful, 
furthermore, of the methodological issue that such legal remedies have only been 
available for 14 years at the time of writing (10 of them under the Labour Party that 
enacted the HRA). On the other hand, this brief period enables a more or less 
exhaustive examination of the record in Parliament. The findings presented here are 
                                                                                                                                           
875; however, see [2005] UKHL 29; (11) A and others; X and others v SSHD [2004] UKHL 56; (12) R 
(Morris) v Westminster CC and the First Secretary of State [2005] EWCA Civ 1184; (13) R (Gabaj) v 
First Secretary of State (unreported); (15) R (Clift) v SSHD [2006] UKHL 54; (16) Smith v Scott [2007] 
CSIH 9 (Scotland); (17) R (Baiai) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 53; (18) R (Thompson) v SSHD [2010] 
UKSC 17; (19) R (Royal College of Nursing) v SSHD [2010] EWHC 2761 (Admin); (20) R(T) v Chief 
Constable of Greater Manchester [2014] UKHL 35. This mirrors the findings in the Ministry of 
Justice’s Responding to Human Rights Judgments (2012, Cm 8432) Annex A, apart from the last, 
which was decided in June 2014. Note: Hooper is inaccurately represented in the official list. The 
decision reported at [2003] EWCA Civ 875 was final, but did not involve the issuance of a declaration 
of incompatibility. The correct citation for the Hooper appeal case addressing the substantive issue was 
[2003] EWCA 813. However, this case was overruled in [2005] UKHL 29. The House of Lords 
acknowledged the incompatibility and confirmed the analysis of Moses J at first instance (which issued 
a declaration of incompatibility), but felt that due to the repeal of the statute, a new declaration was no 
longer needed (see [52], [79]). Despite the tortuous path of litigation and unclear message, I have 
elected to keep Hooper on the list. 
4 Although private members are entitled to put forward bills in Parliament, it remains the case that 
‘private members’ bills which arouse any substantial degree of opposition are unlikely to pass into law’ 
(M Jack (ed), Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice (24th edn, London, LexisNexis, 2011) 526) and 
hence those that succeed typically have cross-party support. In practice, therefore, the role of 
Parliament is dictated by the choices of the Government on how to proceed in remedying the 
incompatibility. Even so, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003 is one 
example of a private member’s bill remedying a section 4 declaration of incompatibility. The Bill 
passed without division in both Houses of Parliament: HC Deb 13 June 2003, vol 406, col 996; HL 




based on scrutiny of all parliamentary debates on every remedial response to a section 
4 declaration, on the floor of each House, in Committees, at Report and ‘Ping Pong’ 
(consideration of amendments) stages, and in consideration of the relevant scrutiny 
reports of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) on each remedial response.5 
Thus, while the period is too brief for sweeping generalisations about the definitive 
constitutional role of section 4 declarations, the completeness of the record allows 
some interesting insights to emerge. The general picture is of a remedial regime that 
differs in important ways from some other weak and strong form systems of 
constitutional judicial review. The parliamentary record displays an attitude that has 
been predominantly accepting of and collaborative with the courts’ role, though also 
minimalist in some responses and on the whole manifesting delays by the 
Government that have no principled defence. Lastly, it appears that there is, indeed, 
evidence of an emerging constitutional convention of response by the Government 
and Parliament to section 4 declarations of incompatibility. 
I. The Landscape of Section 4 Declarations of Incompatibility 
A. The Types of Legislative and Government Response 
The Government may respond to a declaration of incompatibility in various ways. 
First, it legally can choose to do nothing at all. Where this has occurred, however, it 
was because Parliament had already amended the offending legislation prior to the 
declaration (as noted in Figure 8.1 below). On the other hand, despite some lengthy 
delays and the possible exception of prisoner voting (as discussed further below), 
there has been no case to date where the Government or Parliament affirmatively 
chose not to remedy incompatible legislation. Second, the Government can ask 
Parliament to repeal the offending provision by way of an Act of Parliament. In doing 
so, it can either introduce an act among whose central purposes is the intention to 
address the incompatibility (which I will call ‘whole act responses’) or it can add a 
provision to an existing bill that may be related to the issue, but that primarily 
                                                 




concerns other matters (which I will call ‘tacking responses’). Third and finally, the 
Government can amend and replace the offending provision by way of a remedial 
order under section 10 of the HRA. This section empowers a minister to use 
subordinate legislation (an executive order) to amend the act to remove the 
incompatibility. As specified in Schedule 2 to the HRA, the remedial order must be 
laid before Parliament for an affirmative resolution, either before it comes into force 
or, in urgent cases where it is necessary to give it immediate effect, by way of 
affirmative resolution after it has come into force. The remedial orders are also 
subject to scrutiny by the JCHR, which has also given guidance in relation to when 
the use of remedial orders is appropriate. 6  Indeed, the JCHR’s role in the 
parliamentary process is absolutely crucial, though it is explained in detail elsewhere 
in this volume. The broader landscape of the response to declarations of 
incompatibility under the HRA is set out in Figure 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1 Parliamentary responses to section 4 declarations7 
                                                 
6 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Making of Remedial Orders (2001–02, HL 58, HC 473); see also 
the Committee’s Enhancing Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights Judgments (2009–10, HL 
85, HC 455) [22]–[24]. See also Guidance to Departments at back of this Report. 
7 Please consult the methodological appendix at the end of this chapter for information on all other 
figures in this chapter. 
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The chart in Figure 8.1 discloses an unmistakable preference for acting 
through the ordinary legislative procedure. This may explain some of the delays I will 
shortly detail. I return to this issue below. 
B. Promptness of Response 
One of the most important differences between the HRA and some foreign systems is 
the fact that the Government is capable of delaying its response to a section 4 
declaration by a considerable amount of time. Only political pressure—usually from 
the JCHR and civil society—can accelerate the response. As Figure 8.2 shows, the 
delay between the court judgment and the remedial provision coming into force is 
fairly substantial.  
[Insert Figure 2 around here]. 
 
Figure 8.2 The delay between the section 4 declaration and the remedy coming 
into force 
The two outliers in Figure 8.2 are the R(M) and Smith v Scott cases. The 
former case involved a defect in the mental health regime, which for the relevant 
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mental health patients automatically appointed as guardian the ‘nearest relative’ 
without the possibility of the patient applying for variation. In M’s case, the patient’s 
‘nearest relative’ was her adoptive father, whom she accused of having sexually 
abused her. The case thus involved a classic legislative oversight. The incompatibility 
was conceded in the M case, as shown through the exhaustive analysis by Alison 
Young of the passage of the remedial legislation through Parliament, which 
demonstrates that the process was exemplary of dialogue working rather than of 
stubborn foot-dragging.8 Whether the delay was justifiable is another story. The Smith 
v Scott case applied the Strasbourg Court’s Hirst decision,9 which found a blanket ban 
preventing convicted prisoners from voting to be a disproportionate interference with 
their (constructive) right to vote under Article 3 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention. The Government has published a draft bill in response, which presents 
three mutually exclusive options: (1) a voting ban on prisoners sentenced to four years 
or more; (2) one for those sentenced to more than six months; and (3) maintenance of 
the current blanket ban in outright defiance of the Strasbourg judgment.10 The draft 
bill has now been scrutinised by a joint committee.11 The Government has sent mixed 
messages about its plans for the draft bill. On the one hand, the Prime Minister 
declared unequivocally in response to a parliamentary question that ‘prisoners are not 
getting the vote under this government’.12 On the other hand, there is a repeated 
affirmation that the Government’s policy is to comply with its international 
obligations, including the decision of the Strasbourg Court, but that the ultimate 
decision rests with Parliament.13 The constitutional significance of this delay for the 
role of the HRA is further complicated by the fact that UK courts flatly denied to 
                                                 
8 AL Young, ‘Is Dialogue Working under the Human Rights Act 1998?’ [2011] Public Law 773, 783–
84. 
9 Hirst v UK (No 2) [2005] ECHR 681. 
10 I White, Prisoners’ Voting Rights (SN/PC/01764) (London, Parliament and Constitution Centre, 
House of Commons Library, 15 May 2013). 
11 See Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill, Session 2013–14, 
HL Paper 103/HC 924 (18 December 2013). 
12 HC Deb 24 October 2012, vol 551, col 923. 
13 HC Deb 22 November 2012, vol 553, col 745 (Chris Grayling MP): ‘The Prime Minister has made 
clear, on the record, his personal views on this subject, and I have done the same. Those views have not 
changed. However, the Government are under an international law obligation to implement the Court 
judgment. As Lord Chancellor, as well as Secretary of State for Justice, I take my obligation to uphold 
the rule of law seriously. Equally, it remains the case that Parliament is sovereign, and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 explicitly recognises that fact.’ The Ministry of Justice’s explanatory memorandum 
for the draft Bill (Cm 8499) makes the same point at [2]. 
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award a declaration of incompatibility in the pre-Strasbourg UK challenge under the 
HRA,14 and the matter is generally viewed by parliamentarians as a contest between 
the UK and Strasbourg, instead of between the UK courts and the UK Parliament and 
Government.  
Quite apart from these cases, the delays are nonetheless significant. This is 
true even if we compare the UK with jurisdictions where courts have a practice of 
suspending the effect of their declarations of unconstitutionality, a remedy which 
allows the unconstitutional law to remain effective for a particular period of time 
pending an appropriate legislative response. Figure 8.3 compares the rate of delay 
with that observed in Canada, France and Germany. 
[Insert Figure 3 around here]. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Remedial lag time averages for rights cases: 2000–12 
Thus, even where the constitutional remedy of delaying or suspending the 
operation of the declaration of unconstitutionality exists in other systems, the overall 
period of delay under the HRA is significantly higher. There may or may not be 
aspects of the legislative process that are partly responsible for this delay. Yet it is 
reasonable to conclude that a major cause of this difference is the binding effect of the 
period stipulated by the foreign courts and, more importantly, because suspended 
                                                 
14 R (on the application of Pearson and Feal-Martinez) v SSHD; Hirst v HM Attorney General [2001] 
EWHC Admin 239; HC Deb 10 February 2011, vol 523, cols 493–586. 
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declarations only account for a subset of overall cases. At first it appears that once we 
exclude the R(M) (mental health) and Smith v Scott (prisoner voting) cases, the 
differences between the UK, Canada and Germany are not particularly strong. If we 
exclude them, for instance, the average lag time for the UK is approximately 17 rather 
than 25 months. However, if we look at the figures for delay regarding all 
declarations of unconstitutionality in the Canadian and German courts rather than the 
subset of those where the declaration was suspended, we see that the overall average 
delay is still much greater in the UK. Furthermore, if we exclude only R(M) and 
continue to include the prisoner voting case, which is highly pertinent to the enquiry 
here and arguably not a case of good faith dialogic engagement, the average delay 
remains 22 months. On any accounting, therefore, the delays are substantially greater 
in the UK. 
C. General Impact on the Legislative Process 
We can consider the question of impact by looking at the number of judgments and 
extent of the impact of such judgments. As to the first, data compiled for this study 
shows that the number of statutes declared unconstitutional or subject to declarations 
of incompatibility is rather low in international comparison with Canada, France or 
Germany. 




Figure 8.4 Number of statures declared unconstitutional/incompatible on rights-
based grounds by all courts 2000–12 
Admittedly, the number of declarations of incompatibility is only one (albeit 
important) aspect of the judiciary’s impact on legislation under the HRA. Some 
writers treat the particularly muscular power of legislative interpretation available 
under section 3 of the HRA (allowing reading in and reading down) as a form of 
judicial supremacy tantamount to a strike down power. 15  Although to date no 
systematic analysis of how often section 3(1) is used in this fashion has been 
undertaken (nor to my knowledge of its analogues in the Canadian and German 
systems),16 it appears to be relatively infrequent in the UK. At any rate, the low 
number of declarations of incompatibility under the HRA means that the law-makers’ 
business is disrupted somewhat infrequently by rights review under the HRA. This 
may help explain why they have what Sathanapally calls a ‘low profile’ 17  in 
Parliament.  
Another potential reason for the low profile relates to the extent of impact 
generated by the particular decisions. Impact can be judged along a number of lines.18 
It can have direct and indirect effects. It may involve symbolic or expressive impact 
(such as non-pecuniary satisfaction, strengthening constitutional values, exposing 
unlawful behavior in the media or by eroding public support for human rights values 
by providing opportunities for media spin). It may involve the provision or loss of 
certain benefits, services or other rights for individuals. It may consist of new 
allocative costs and other disruptions to administration or result in a response that 
eliminates a discretion that was previously used to benefit a number of persons. 
Alternatively, it may be a form of political backlash in which opposition to the 
judgment sets back the overall enjoyment of the right even further.19 On the whole, 
                                                 
15  S Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 171, 185. 
16 Both of which are explained in the Methodological Appendix at the end of this chapter. 
17 A Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012) 138–39. 
18  See S Halliday and M Hertogh (eds), Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
19 I have explored a number of these areas and the phenomenon of backlash in Judging Social Rights 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 63–85. 
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impact concerns not only the number of persons affected by the decision, but also the 
nature of the impact on particular individuals.  
These are difficult dimensions in the study law and politics, and they caution 
against making sweeping generalisations about impact in particular regimes. Subject 
to that caveat, it is important to have a look at the most immediate political impact 
judged by the policies enacted in response to the various judgments, responses which 
have been endorsed as compliant with the judgments by the independent JCHR. Table 
8.1 sets out a representative sample of such responses.20 It shows that the immediate 
discernible impact of the HRA, while in my view very worthwhile, has also been 
relatively modest in respect of the number of people affected and the extent of 
intrusion into controversial legislative territory. A number of such cases concern 
procedural rights or matters regarded as legislative oversight, and relatively few 
extended expensive or controversial benefits. Even the most significant cases tended 
to affect thousands of persons (at least in the initial years following the judgment), 
contrary to what is often the case in America and Germany.  
  
                                                 
20 The sample contains most and is definitely representative. I have omitted cases where the legislation 
was in place before the declaration. I also omitted the much-debated impact of the Belmarsh case, 
which led to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and with it the new control order regime. In 
numbers, between 2005 and 2011, there were a total of 52 control orders issued, all related to suspected 
Islamic terrorists, primarily in later years against UK nationals (not permitted under the pre-Prevention 
of Terrorism Act regime). See D Anderson, Control Orders in 2011: Final Report of the Independent 
Reviewer on the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (London, The Stationery Office, 2012). As a matter 
of sheer numbers, then, the impact was modest and perhaps even facilitated the expansion of executive 
detention without charge through a rushed parliamentary process: see the text accompanying nn 49–55 
below. However, since the case and its successors have concerned deprivations of liberty without 
ordinary due process, it took on a symbolic importance among writers that is far greater than these 
numbers suggest.  
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Table 8.1 Impact of section 4 declarations: a representative sample 
 
Impact Case Outcome 
Minimal 
McR Repeal of rarely enforced anti-sodomy statute. 
Anderson Replacement of Home Secretary’s discretion to increase duration of term of 
imprisonment (the tariff) served without parole with a legislative scheme of 
proposed ‘starting point’ minimum sentences, dubbed ‘Blunkett’s revenge’ 
by a peer.21 
Blood and 
Tarbuck 
Amendment to scheme to allow deceased father’s name to be added to a 
child’s birth certificate. 





Challenged scheme for fighting ‘benefits tourism’ required local authorities 
assessing priority need for homelessness assistance to disregard non-
nationals who required leave to remain in the country. New scheme 
extended rights to British, EU and certain Commonwealth citizens to be 
given an offer of accommodation (no more) in the private rented sector for 




Challenged scheme allowing persons barred from working with children or 
vulnerable adults due to past criminal convictions the right to make 
representations only after the barring decision. Revised scheme permits 
representations before the barring decision.23 
  ‘The remedial order only provides a mechanism by which a sex offender 
                                                 
21 HL Deb 16 June 2003, vol 649, col 588 (Lord Ackner); see also cols 575–77 (Lord Woolf). The new 
sentencing guidelines in effect provided a legislative framework of sentencing that not only replaced 
the guidelines developed by the judges earlier, but also departed substantially from them in substance. 
The case may therefore be considered an instance of political backlash and in that respect its impact, 
seen as cutting against the spirit of the judgment to which it responded, may have been more than 
moderate. 
22 HC Deb 21 July 2008, vol 673, cols 610–13. 
23 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 67. 
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Thompson can apply for a police review of whether they should cease to be on the 
[Sex Offenders] register.’ 24  It also provided a right of appeal to the 
magistrates’ court on any such administrative determination. 
   
Significant 
Bellinger  The Gender Recognition Act 2005 clarified the legal consequences of 
gender recognition and established the Gender Recognition Tribunal, 
which by 2012 had issued 3,108 full Gender Recognition Certificates.25 
Roth Replacement of mandatory heavy penalty scheme applicable to hauliers 
carrying clandestine entrants to the UK with a new executive power to 
reduce fines coupled with new rights of appeal. 
Baiai Abolition of a discriminatory scheme that, in an effort to prevent ‘sham 
marriages’. prohibited people subject to immigration control from marrying 
without authorisation, except in a Church of England (CoE) religious 
ceremony. The Government did not level down, but extended to all such 
persons the rights enjoyed by those marrying in a CoE religious ceremony. 
 
II. Do Declarations of Incompatibility Promote Greater 
Democratic Deliberation? 
There has been a significant amount written about the idea of constitutional judicial 
review as ‘democratic dialogue’ between courts and legislatures, notably in Canada,26 
                                                 
24 HL Deb 5 July 2012, vol 738, cols 875, 876 (Baronness Stowell of Beeston, introducing the order in 
the Lords). See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Draft Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Remedial) Order 
2012 (Second Report) (2012–13, HL 8, HC 166) [14]–[17] (discussing the dialogue between the JCHR 
which convinced the Government to add the appeal to the magistrates’ court, but not to the High Court 
or Crown Court. The case serves as a good example of the benefits of intra-parliamentary dialogue on 
rights review).  
25 Ministry of Justice, Statistics Bulletin: Gender Recognition Statistics: October to December 2012 (4 
April 2012).  
26 See (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 for an issue dedicated entirely to the metaphor of 
dialogue and reply by the principal authors of the idea in Canadian law to their critics. Kent Roach has 
expounded and defended the idea in a range of publications: see, eg, ‘Dialogic Judicial Review and its 
Critics’ (2004) 23 Supreme Court Law Review 49 and ‘Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next 
Decade of Scholarship’ [2007] 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 169. For a fresh perspective, see R 
Dixon, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference’ [2009] 47 Osgoode Hall 
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in respect of the HRA,27 and in at times unfairly neglected earlier work on this theme 
by Barry Friedman in the US.28 The basic idea as outlined in the seminal article by 
Hogg and Bushell (now Thornton) is as follows: ‘Where a judicial decision is open to 
legislative reversal, modification, or avoidance, then it is meaningful to regard the 
relationship between the Court and the competent legislative body as a dialogue.’29 
The authors argue that where dialogue occurs, ‘any concern about the legitimacy of 
judicial review is greatly diminished’.30 However, they later appear to back down 
from this normative claim.31 
It is important not to be distracted by the metaphor of dialogue and the debates 
about its accuracy and significance.32 The more focused question is whether there is 
something about the scheme in the HRA that promotes improved democratic 
deliberation,33 not whether it leads to exchanges that are iterative in the egalitarian 
sense implied by the dialogue metaphor. So some pertinent questions include the 
following: are Members of Parliament welcoming of judicial decisions under the 
HRA thus far or do they feel dominated by them? Do they exercise their own 
normative capacities when scrutinising remedial legislation or do they merely ratify 
what the judges say? Are they considering issues that may have been neglected or are 
they being forced to backtrack grudgingly from earlier legislative commitments?  
                                                                                                                                           
Law Journal 235 (exploring in particular the role of courts in ‘second-look’ cases where legislation 
enacted in response to previous judgments is challenged again). 
27 T Hickman, ‘Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
[2005] Public Law 306; AL Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2009) esp ch 5; AL Young, ‘Deference, Dialogue and the Search for Legitimacy’ 
(2010) 30 OJLS 815; Sathanapally (n 17). 
28 B Friedman, ‘Dialogue and Judicial Review’ (1993) 91 Michigan Law Review 577. At 653, for 
instance, he states: ‘The Constitution is not interpreted by aloof judges imposing their will on the 
people. Rather, constitutional interpretation is an elaborate discussion between judges and the body 
politic.’ 
29 PW Hogg and AA Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights isn’t Such a Bad Thing after All)’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75, 79. 
30 ibid 80. 
31 PW Hogg, AAB Thornton and WK Wright, ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited—or Much Ado about 
Metaphors’ (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 30: ‘Dialogue theory does not provide a 
justification for judicial review.’ 
32 For sceptical views about the relevance of the debate and metaphor, see A Kavanagh, Constitutional 
Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009)  (n 13) 408-
411; Gardbaum (n 15) 15–16 and ch 5. 
33 For the view that judicial review can play this role more generally, see S Fredman, Human Rights 
Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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Two excellent studies have examined a few of these questions in some detail, 
though for reasons of space they cannot be reviewed fully here.34 In her important 
article, Alison Young examines whether dialogue is working under the HRA by 
looking at Hansard relating to a range of legislative responses for important select 
cases.35 Young both reviews the experience under the HRA and also presents an 
analytical framework detailing normative guidance for legal interpretation that will 
enhance democratic dialogue under the HRA. My concern here is with the former 
aspect. Young examines, in this respect, legislative debates that involved 
interpretation of the rights that extended well beyond the judicial interpretations, 
particularly in the cases of R(M), Bellinger, Roth and Morris. 36  She regards the 
debates surrounding R(M) and Bellinger as showing extensive debates regarding the 
appropriate remedy, rather than definition of the right, and that Morris involved 
debates about both. Roth, by contrast, was an instance of where the legislature largely 
accepted the Court of Appeal’s analysis and did not engage with the balancing 
exercise presented by the issue. Young concludes that judicial deference on questions 
of rights is preventing the proper functioning of democratic dialogue, because the 
judges have pre-empted discussion in Parliament by showing a priori deference in 
their judgments. The judges should rather avoid withholding their views, so that 
parliamentarians can take them well into account when devising their response. 
Sathanapally’s book examines dialogue and deliberative democratic theory before 
exploring in detail the use of section 4 declarations and, in particular, illuminating 
case studies of the Bellinger and Belmarsh cases. 
My own analysis examining all instances of Hansard (debates in the Commons 
and the Lords, inclusive of Committee, Report and Ping Pong stages), as well as 
relevant committee reports, is at present still underway. However, some pictures are 
emerging that complement and to some extent confirm and extend the analyses by 
Young and Sathanapally. As to the idea that the courts may be ‘dominating’ 
Parliament in some fashion, there is almost no evidence of this occurring if we are to 
                                                 
34 The research in this chapter was completed shortly before the publication of Sathanapally’s Beyond 
Disagreement (n 17), precluding any extensive consideration. I have nonetheless referred to parts of the 
analysis throughout this chapter.  
35 Young (n 8). 
36 ibid 782–91.  
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take expressions of protest in Parliament as the key indicator. My analysis on this 
point accords with Sathanapally’s, which finds that: ‘The nature of interaction has 
generally been cooperative rather than conflictual.’ 37  The case of Thompson 
(concerning the Sex Offenders Register), on which see section III below, was the 
exception to this general rule, but a bit of chafing does not undo the norm. The overall 
trend is one of simple workaday acceptance of the domestic court’s judgment and the 
need to respond to it, sin ire et studio, or ‘without passion or hatred’.38 However, the 
superficial calm towards particular judgments should not necessarily be equated with 
political satisfaction with the substantive legal regime in place under the HRA. The 
acceptance of domestic court judgments may reflect a certain respect for judicial 
independence in British constitutional arrangements. The Conservative Party made a 
manifesto commitment prior to the 2010 election to repeal the HRA and replace it 
with a British bill of rights, though the commitment to repeal was abandoned in the 
Coalition Agreement (with the Liberal Democrats) that followed the election.39  
One might, on the other hand, believe that the impact upon Parliament has 
been more insidious, with parliamentarians laconically accepting the policies 
implicitly mandated by the courts in section 4 declarations. On this point, there is 
clear evidence, in my view, that parliamentarians do view the role for courts as being 
one of interpreting the rights at first instance, and the role of Parliament to fashion the 
remedy as well as to undertake any balancing exercise not implicitly foreclosed by the 
judgment. As statements reproduced in section III below affirm, parliamentarians tend 
to view themselves as accepting and working with the judgments of the courts and not 
ordinarily being in a position to offer a contrary interpretation of the right once the 
court has ruled definitively on the issue. This is not necessarily insidious domination 
or subtle policy distortion, though it is arguably so. It may equally or perhaps better 
be regarded as evidence of parliamentarians accepting the constitutional division of 
                                                 
37 Sathanapally (n 17) 224. 
38 The expression is borrowed from M Weber, Theory of Economic and Social Organization (trans AR 
Henderson and T Parsons, New York, Free Press, 1947) 340.  
39 An Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010 (available at: 
www.conservatives.com) at 79 (proposing to replace the Act with a UK bill of rights that would 
‘encourage greater social responsibility’). The Coalition Agreement committed both parties to the 
investigation of the possibility of a bill of rights that would ‘ensure’ the Convention ‘continues to be 
enshrined in British law’. See The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (London: Cabinet 
Office, May 2010) 11. 
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responsibilities implied by the HRA and accession to the European Convention. As 
just observed, it is furthermore impossible to say that these latter grander 
constitutional questions have been in any way ‘passive’ in British politics since 2010. 
The UK’s constitutional moment is as much right now as it was in 1998.  
The phenomenon of ‘passive acceptance’ may, on the other hand, undercut 
any strong argument that under the HRA, Parliament plays an equal, revisory or final 
role in defining the rights themselves and assessing limitations to them, a point 
regarded as quite important by some writers. 40  On the whole, however, there is 
perhaps too much emphasis on the point of ‘normative finality’ in discussions on this 
issue. Judges, under the HRA, hardly try to provide expansive or exhaustive 
definitions of the rights. Rather, they give case-by-case indications of how particular 
policies fail to comply with abstract rights, leaving much undecided both at the 
normative stage and in particular at the constructive remedial stage. 41  And, 
furthermore, there is much room for parliamentary analysis of human rights 
obligations by the JCHR in particular when assessing bills for compatibility, an 
exercise that is routine and wide-ranging in each session rather than limited to the few 
cases a year considered by the courts. So the ‘normative finality’ accepted by 
Parliament in the cases examined here is in fact a small part of normative scope of the 
right and balancing exercise associated with it. It is a norm relating to the avoidance 
of conflict and accepting the court’s ultimate interpretive supremacy rather than a 
reluctance to carry out its own assessments. 
More broadly, it is not a widely shared tenet in modern constitutionalism that 
only legislatures can speak with the authority of a democratic institution. If our view 
of a contemporary democracy comprises not only respect for rights, but also the 
practice of rights-based constitutional review, then judicial review can itself claim a 
non-legislative variety of democratic pedigree.42 On that view, which is also held by 
some prominent deliberative democrats, the question is whether the practice does 
                                                 
40 See below, nn 69 and 70 and accompanying text. 
41 They largely fit, in other words, the model outlined and endorsed in C Sunstein, One Case at a Time: 
Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2001). 
42 See R Dworkin, ‘Introduction: The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise’ in his Freedom’s 




contribute defensibly to outcomes best described as democratic or democracy-
promoting. 43  There are features of practice under the HRA that would count 
favourably in such an analysis. 
One such feature is the extent to which courts can assist legislatures to 
overcome what Rosalind Dixon calls blind spots and burdens of inertia in the 
legislative process, or what I have elsewhere called an absence of legislative focus on 
rights issues. 44  By legislative focus, I mean either that the legislature has not 
considered the point at all or that the act was adopted at a time when the concept of 
rights was substantially different from that which the society has presently legally 
embraced through its constitution or ratification of international instruments. Figure 
8.6 demonstrates that approximately 37 per cent of section 4 cases thus far concerned 
statutes where in my estimation there was an absence of legislative focus.      
[Insert Figure 6 around here – absence of legislative focus]. 
 
                                                 
43 J Habermas, (W Rehg (trans)) Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996), 280: ‘[A] 
rather bold constitutional adjudication is even required in cases that concern the implementation of 
democratic procedure and the deliberative form of political opinion and will-formation.’ 
44 R Dixon, ‘Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form versus Weak-Form Judicial 
Review Revisited’ (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 391, 402ff; J King, Judging 
Social Rights (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 164–65, 169–73. For an in-depth study 
of this issue in UK constitutionalism, see A Kavanagh, ‘Proportionality and Parliamentary Debates: 
Exploring Some Forbidden Territory’ (2014) 32 OJLS 443.  
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Figure 8.5 Of the incompatibilities remedied by post-decision legislative 
response, did the challenged act manifest legislative focus on the rights issue?45 
 Furthermore, Table 8.2 below demonstrates that a substantial majority of 
successful claimants are from marginalised groups that do not enjoy favourable 
representation in Parliament. It also shows that most of the remaining claimant groups 
were, though not in any way particularly vulnerable, still in most cases reasonably 
discrete and unlikely to register on any political agenda (and hence face what Dixon 
calls the ‘burdens of inertia’). On this view, then, the practice of judicial review has 
arguably promoted the interests and raised the profile of vulnerable groups, a 
significant number of whom could not or did not vote at all. 
[Insert Table 2 here: please ensure all on one page]. 
Table 8.2 Claimant groups and section 4 declarations of incompatibility 
 
Marginalised groups Non-marginalised groups  
 
Case Claimant group Case Claimant group 
R(H) Mental health patients Roth Hauliers, lorry drivers 
McR Homosexual men Blood and Tarbuck Children of deceased 
fathers, conceived by 
fertility treatment 
Anderson Prisoners Wilkinson Widowers 
R(D) Prisoners Hooper Widowers 
Bellinger Transgender persons Wright Care workers 
                                                 
45 This concerns those declarations where the legislative response occurred post-decision, except for 
Wright, which was nearly simultaneous. In Chester v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63 
[136], Lord Sumption rejected the contention that there was no substantive legislative debate 
supporting the legislative ban on prisoner voting in the UK Parliament supporting the Representation of 
the People Act 2000.  
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R(M) Mental health patients R (Royal College of 
Nursing) 
Care workers 
Belmarsh Foreign suspected terrorists   
Morris/Gabaj Poor non-citizens   
Baiai Foreigners having non-CoE 
marriages 
  
Clift Prisoners   
Smith v Scott Prisoners   
Thompson Convicted sex offenders   




 Other features of the practice under the HRA are less favourable from the 
perspective of deliberative democracy. One such feature is the consistent strategy by 
the Government of aiming only for ‘minimal compliance’, one that has provoked 
‘recurring criticism’ by the JCHR.46  Another is the time given in Parliament for 
deliberation. One early concern was whether responses to section 4 declarations might 
in any way overburden Parliament. Quite to the contrary, the paucity of time spent on 
floor debates and even in committee proceedings can be quite remarkable, all the 
more so in view of the delays involved in providing remedies. The response to the 
Roth case was an interesting example, also noted by Young and Sathanapally.47 In 
Roth, the Court of Appeal found a penalty regime for hauliers who knowingly or 
unknowingly transport clandestine entrants into the UK to be an unfair violation of 
the Article 6 right to a fair trial and disproportionate interference with the right to 
property under Article 1 of the First Protocol. By way of response, however, the 
Government introduced the legislative amendment at Report stage in the Commons, 
and debate on it was severely curtailed by the use of timetabling or ‘guillotine’ 
                                                 
46 Joint Committee on Human Rights (n 6) [168]–[170].  
47 Young (n 8) 787–88; Sathanapally (n 17) 145–46. 
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motions, to the dismay of a number of MPs and even peers.48 The evidence showed 
that many parliamentarians wanted much more time, not less, spent on responding to 
the judgment. Even so, the JCHR praised the resulting Schedule 8 to the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, finding it to be a ‘measured and proportionate 
response to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Roth’.49  
The process leading to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 has been identified 
as another example of inadequate time for debate.50 The Government announced at 
first reading of the Bill that one of its central purposes was to comply in good faith 
with the Belmarsh decision,51 which found powers permitting indefinite detention of 
foreign suspected terrorists incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the Convention. 
The Government decided to introduce new legislation rather than prolong the 
incompatible scheme, which was due to expire within three months of the judgment. 
As is well known, the Bill’s proposed invasions of personal liberty were profound,52 
and so the first question asked by David Davis MP, the Shadow Home Secretary 
(Conservative), was: ‘What is the immediate emergency that demands that draconian 
powers against British subjects be rushed through these Houses of Parliament without 
proper consideration, scrutiny or debate?’53 Davis suggested that the Lords’ judgment, 
which he agreed with and supported, 54  was being used opportunistically to ram 
through an invasive piece of post-9/11 legislation in short order. The JCHR also 
protested loudly and clearly: 
[T]here can be no justification for including such wide and unprecedented powers of 
executive detention in legislation which is being rushed through Parliament at a speed 
which prevents proper scrutiny, in order to be on the statute book in time to deal with 
                                                 
48 See in particular the protest of Baroness Anelay HL Deb, 24 June 2002, vol 636, col 109. 
49 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Bill (2001–02, HL 132, 
HC 961) [110].  
50 Sathanapally’s (n 17, 196–204) analysis is particularly thorough. 
51 HC Deb 22 February 2005, vol 431, cols 151–55 (Charles Clarke MP). Such a debate on first reading 
is exceptional in the legislative process, and ostensibly was due to the high profile of the judgment and 
the Government’s decision to characterise the situation as exceptionally urgent. 
52 The Bill introduced a new scheme of ‘control orders’, which applied to British nationals as well as 
foreigners and allowed, among other things, pervasive control of the lives of the controlees through a 
combination of house arrest, electronic tagging, mobility restrictions and control on communications. 
The orders, furthermore, could be imposed as a civil measure without the controlee ever seeing the 
evidence in support of the orders or even being able to communicate with the special advocate who 
represented him after the advocate had seen closed evidence. 
53 HC Deb 22 February 2005, vol 431, col 156.  
54 ibid (quoting from the judgment in his response to the Home Secretary). 
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those detained under provisions which are shortly to expire. Legislation passed at such 
speed should be confined to that which is essential to deal with the problem about to 
arise … which means that all of the provisions concerning derogating control orders 
should be taken out of the Bill, if necessary to be returned to when there is more 
opportunity for careful parliamentary scrutiny.55 
Although it is easy (and right) to focus on the parliamentary dismay about the rushed 
timetable, in actual fact, the legislative response to the Belmarsh decision evidenced 
by far the most legally and constitutionally sophisticated, highly principled and 
certainly the most drawn-out parliamentary discussion about the key rights issue 
identified by the courts under the HRA. The only other bill generating anywhere near 
the depth, scope and sophistication of response was the post-Bellinger passage of the 
the Gender Recognition Bill. In both cases, the responses were whole act responses, 
so we can compare them very crudely by noting the overall volume of discussion to 
the entire bill in floor debates. If we look to the overall number of words spoken 
during the floor debates for responses to both decisions, the Commons debate 
responding to Belmarsh was roughly twice the length of that responding to Bellinger, 
and the Lords debate was approximately a third longer.56 Of course, this comparison 
does not confirm adequacy of discussion, for the issues were arguably more complex 
and disagreements far more heated. 
If we pan out from these interesting but distinctive examples, a fairly clear 
theme regarding timing and deliberation emerges from the evidence on the whole. In 
most cases apart from those mentioned above, there is very little, if any, direct 
engagement with the rights issues raised in the courts’ judgments and almost no 
engagement with the judicial reasoning itself. In a number of instances, the judgments 
are not mentioned by name and the issue gets only fleeting mention in the general 
debates of either House. A more interesting factor, relating more to the legislative 
process itself, is that the quality of deliberation in Parliament tends to be correlated 
                                                 
55 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Prevention of Terrorism Bill: Preliminary Report (2004–05, HL 
61, HC 389) [8]. See also Joint Committee on Human Rights, Prevention of Terrorism Bill (2004–05, 
HL 68, HC 334) para 1.  
56 And both such debates were indeed massive: the Commons Hansard for the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005 amounts to approximately 150,000 words (according to an MS Word count), whereas the 
Lords Hansard amounted to approximately 144,000 words. Furthermore, Commons Committee 
Hansard adds about 75,000 words to that figure, whereas the Lords Committee adds 109,000 words to 
its own. The Ping Pong stage adds another 125,000 words. In all cases, roll call votes for divisions have 
been included in the word count, so real figures are somewhat lower. 
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with the type of response, and specifically whether it is a whole act, remedial order or 
tacking response. Figure 8.7 gives the present distribution of responses along these 
lines. 
[Insert Figure 7 around here]. 
 
Figure 8.6 Legislative responses to DOIs under the HRA 
 Notwithstanding a clear preference for tacking responses, the evidence 
suggests that there is much clearer engagement with the rights issue and remedial 
options in cases of both whole act responses and, though to a much lesser extent, 
parliamentary scrutiny of remedial orders. There are a few reasons for this. The first is 
that the rights issue is likely to figure more prominently among the key issues during 
the second reading of the bill, where its key principles are debated and views of the 
House can not only be formed but also fed into the subsequent amendments at 
committee stage before executive views become ossified. Another is that tacking 
amendments are often inserted into extremely important and wide-ranging bills that 
will affect millions of people. 57  MPs and peers are thus likely to face issue 
                                                 
57 Some examples include the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (response to Anderson); the Mental Health 
Act 2007 (much delayed response to R(M)); the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 (delayed response 
to Morris and Gabaj); and the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (response to McR).  
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exhaustion, and compatibility issues will be subordinated to the more important 
battles. Furthermore, tacking responses tend to get introduced late in the legislative 
process and sometimes quite late in the day (or evening), compounding issue 
exhaustion with physical exhaustion.  
The debates concerning remedial order responses, on the other hand, are 
focused precisely on the rights issue, and the dossier available to parliamentarians will 
make the JCHR reports central to the issue before them,58 and the JCHR has been no 
less vigilant in its review of proposed remedial orders (as well as of the use of the 
remedial order procedure). The possible flaw with them, however, is that since they 
are executive orders approved by resolution rather than primary legislation, they may 
enjoy an even lower profile in Parliament than have some of the other amendments. 
For instance, the debate in the Lords concerning the remedial order following the 
Thompson case (concerning the rights of sex offenders to request their removal from 
the Sex Offenders Register) reads very well in Hansard. It is focused, careful and 
engaged with material points raised in the JCHR report. What Hansard did not report, 
however, was that there were fewer than 10 peers in the room during the debate and 
more than one was evidently not paying attention to the discussion.59 Indeed, a debate 
an hour earlier on a motion regarding the welfare and transportation of horses in the 
EU was much more lively and well attended. Even so, the JCHR has urged the 
Government to make more frequent use of remedial orders to ‘remedy 
incompatibilities more swiftly’. 60  And were one asked to rank the quality of 
deliberation and scrutiny in types of parliamentary responses, the clear order appears 
to be whole acts, followed by remedial orders, followed by tacking responses. 
III. A Constitutional Convention of Response? 
Albert Venn Dicey considered that the conventions of the constitution ‘consist of 
maxims or practices which, though they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown, 
                                                 
58 Remedial orders followed R(H), Baiai and Thompson, the details for which are available in the 
Ministry of Justice’s Responding to Human Rights Judgments (2012, Cm 8432) Annex A. 
59 These are based on the author’s observations from the gallery during the debate, which is reported in 
HL Deb 5 July 2012, vol 436, cols 876ff. There are (remarkably) no official attendance records. 
60 Joint Committee on Human Rights (n 6) para 22. 
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of Ministers, and of other persons under the constitution, are not in strictness laws at 
all’.61 The hallmark of a constitutional convention in this tradition is that it is regarded 
as constitutionally binding, but not legally binding. Some authors, Aileen Kavanagh 
prominent among them, have speculated there may be an emerging constitutional 
convention in favour of legislative amendment following a section 4 declaration.62 
This section presents evidence that supports that view, though it is not conclusive.  
In an influential63 analysis, Ivor Jennings identified three key questions in any 
inquiry about the existence of a constitutional convention: ‘First, what are the 
precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by 
a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule?’64 Starting with the first of these for 
our present subject, the precedents suggest an almost uniform practice of legislative 
amendment by way of response. The arguable exception has been the Smith v Scott 
decision on prisoners’ rights to vote (which accepts and applies the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Hirst), yet there too, as discussed above, a 
response is awaited.65 At any rate, this one instance of either extreme delay or non-
compliance is not conclusive. Some commentators do not believe that complete 
uniformity of action is required to establish a constitutional convention, 66  and in 
international law it is not necessary that a practice manifest ‘absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule’ in order to determine the existence of legally binding 
international custom.67 And, as previously noted, the distinctive aspect of that case is 
that anger has been directed at Strasbourg rather than at UK courts, the latter tending 
(with some variation) to agree with the Government that the issue is a matter for 
Parliament.68 
                                                 
61 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, London, Macmillan, 
1959) 23–24. 
62 Kavanagh (n 17) 289. See also 488. 
63 See, eg, Reference re Questions Concerning Amendment of Constitution of Canada [1981] 1 SCR 
753, 888 (the ‘Patriation Reference’). 
64 I Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th edn, London, University of London Press, 1959) 136. 
See also J Jaconelli, ‘Do Constitutional Conventions Bind?’ (1999) 64 CLJ 149; N Barber, ‘Laws and 
Constitutional Conventions’ [2009] LQR 194. 
65 See White (n 10). 
66 Jaconelli (n 64) 153, but see also 165–66. 
67 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 [186]. 
68 This was the approach taken in the judgment of Laws LJ in Chester v Secretary of State for Justice 
25 
 
Passing over the second question momentarily, we can consider the third, 
which is whether there is a reason for the rule. Different answers are plausible. The 
sceptical view, which we may associate with Francesca Klug and Danny Nicol,69 
would maintain that it was precisely both the legal and policy aim of the HRA to 
reserve legal and political sovereignty for the UK Parliament, as supplemented by the 
well-informed activity of the JCHR. Gardbaum also argues that a legislative response 
should not follow automatically, but rather that Parliament should have the political 
discretion to reasonably disagree with the court’s assessment.70 The more supportive 
view of a constitutional convention could offer the following reasons for the rule: to 
not do so would: (a) likely put the UK in breach of its binding international 
obligations; (b) disrupt the scheme of the HRA, which seeks to give real rather than 
illusory remedies in UK courts for violations of Convention rights; and (c) undermine 
the constitutional position of the judiciary and thus strain relations of comity between 
it and the other branches of government. And by way of rebuttal of the sceptical view, 
critics could point to the widely held view that the HRA was intended to function in a 
scheme that would generate considerable if not overwhelming political pressure to 
amend the laws to ensure conformity. On this view, the parliamentary sovereigntist’s 
proper mode of disagreement would be to repeal or amend the HRA, or take an 
exceptional legislative stand on particular issues when they arise. 
If we turn to the second of Jennings’ questions—whether the actors felt bound 
to obey—then we can see that parliamentary views have been uneven, but when 
matters have come to a head, most have sided more with the view that there is some 
sort of obligation. Although this is not the place for an exhaustive survey, some 
                                                                                                                                           
[2010] EWCA Civ 1439, which ruled not only that a second declaration of incompatibility was 
inappropriate, but also, at [32]–[35], that the question of prisoner enfranchisement was in principle not 
a matter suitable for resolution in UK courts. In the Supreme Court decision on this case ([2013] UKSC 
63), the leading judgment of Lord Mance concentrated almost entirely on the obligation to give effect 
to Strasbourg jurisprudence on the topic and touched very briefly upon the genuine rights issue at issue: 
compare [35] with the remainder of his judgment. Lady Hale and Lord Clarke did discuss the 
substantive issues briefly ([86]–[98]; [109]–[111]), while Lord Sumption discussed the substantive 
matter at the greatest length and concluded at [137] that he would not have found UK arrangements 
incompatible with the Convention absent the clear view of the Strasbourg Court on the matter. See also 
Pearson and Feal-Martinez (n 14) for similar statements.  
69 F Klug, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2003] European Human Rights Law 
Review 125, 131; D Nicol, ‘Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act’ [2006] Public Law 722, 744. 
70 Gardbaum (n 15) 27, 36, 123, 201–02. For my critique of this proposal, see J King, ‘Rights and the 
Rule of Law in Third Way Constitutionalism’ (2014) 30 Constitutional Commentary 101. 
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examples corroborate this view. The first can be found in a pertinent statement in the 
White Paper setting out the case for the Human Rights Bill: ‘2.10 A declaration that 
legislation is incompatible with the Convention rights will not of itself have the effect 
of changing the law, which will continue to apply. But it will almost certainly prompt 
the Government and Parliament to change the law.’71 This is consistent with views 
later stated in Parliament during some responses to declarations of incompatibility. 
For example, after the decision in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, engaged in the following 
exchange during the second reading for what became the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005: 
Mr. Clarke (Home Secretary): The third motivating principle [for the bill] is the 
need to meet the Law Lords’ judgment. In general, I do not regard it as a successful 
and positive state of affairs when the senior judiciary of this country, the Law Lords, 
and the Executive are in rather different places, and certainly not in terms of measures 
of this type. Their criticism of the regime in place was that it was disproportionate in 
character and discriminatory, and we should take that criticism extremely seriously. 
The measures that I am putting to the House in the Bill would address that question 
directly.  
…  
Mr. Cash (Con): … It is not a question of whether or not he is complying with the 
Law Lords’ judgment. The problem arises because the Government have got 
themselves into a complete mess with regard to the human rights legislation. Surely 
the point is simply that, to ensure that the House can legislate on its own terms, it 
must legislate notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998, and then he is in the 
clear. Does he not see that?  
Mr. Clarke: I do not accept any of that. I simply do not accept the argument. I do not 
think that it is correct. What I do think is that when the Law Lords of this country 
make a set of criticisms about the way that we are operating that is well founded, by a 
vote of eight to one, it is incumbent on the Government—and, I would argue, on 
Parliament—to respond to that and decide how to deal with it.72 
In an earlier part of the debate, as well, Mr Clarke observed that: ‘If the Law Lords 
say that we have discriminatory and disproportionate legislation, I believe that there is 
an obligation on the whole House, not simply on the Government, to address that, and 
that is what we are doing.’73  
                                                 
71 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill 1997 (Cm 3782, 1997) para 2.10. 
72 HC Deb, 23 February 2005, vol 431, cols 345–46. 
73 HC Deb 22 February 2005, vol 431, col 158.  
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In almost all legislative responses, there have been no direct calls by 
frontbenchers to disregard a declaration of incompatibility by UK courts. Indeed, one 
must look with diligence to find any reference to the judicial decision in most 
parliamentary debates, and in a few cases there is none at all. There have been 
occasional references to the ‘non-binding’ nature of the declarations, however. For 
instance, the JCHR in its report in the 2002–03 session commented that, unlike after 
an adverse decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the Government is not 
‘obliged’ to respond to a declaration of incompatibility.74 And while in the response 
to the Roth decision of the Court of Appeal, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, at 
one point said ‘We must also take account of the Roth judgment … and we shall table 
an amendment’, another minister (Rosie Winterton) later tabled the amendment itself 
declaring that at least part of it ‘addresses a non-binding concern of the Court of 
Appeal in Roth’.75 However, both these statements appear to refer to a legal notion of 
bindingness rather than anything material to a constitutional convention.  
Until quite recently, and apart from the distinctive issue of prisoner voting that I 
have addressed above, nearly all cases have not been about whether to amend the 
legislation, but rather how. However, the response to the Thompson case broke new 
ground in ways that both support and detract from the view that there is a 
constitutional convention of response by amendment. In Thompson, the Supreme 
Court held incompatible a legislative scheme that prevented convicted sex offenders 
from having any possibility of having their names removed from the Sex Offenders 
Register. Both the Prime Minister, David Cameron, 76  and the Home Secretary, 
Theresa May,77 declared themselves ‘appalled’ by the Court’s decision, a sentiment 
echoed by the Labour Shadow Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, when the matter came 
before Parliament.78 Indeed, even Jack Straw, a former Labour Lord Chancellor and 
Secretary of State for Justice, had the following to say in support of his political 
adversary: 
                                                 
74 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Draft Gender Recognition Bill (Nineteenth Report) (2002–03, 
HL Paper 188-I, HC 1276-I) para 17. 
75 HC Deb 12 July 2002, vol 386, col 928. 
76 R Ford, ‘Sex Register Ruling Provokes an Outrage’ The Times (London, 17 February 2011) 5. 
77 HC Deb 16 February 2011, vol 523, col 959. 
78 HC Deb 16 February 2011, vol 523, cols 959–69. 
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I support the Home Secretary’s views on the merits of the existing sex offenders 
register and her concern about the Court’s decision, but will she confirm that under 
section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 there is absolutely no obligation on her or the 
House to change the law one bit? All the Court did was to issue a declaration of 
incompatibility and section 4 makes it absolutely clear that any decision following 
that is a matter for the sovereign Parliament. It would be entirely lawful for the House 
and her to say that the existing regime will continue without any amendment.79 
This statement flatly contradicts the idea of a constitutional convention, from a senior 
parliamentarian. By way of reply, the Home Secretary noted his statement, but 
continued with her overarching message that ‘we are appalled by the decision … but 
we do have to make a change. We will do so in the most minimal way possible’.80 
Furthermore, the Government delivered a mixed message in its subsequent 
parliamentary introduction of the remedial order. It arose for consideration first in a 
delegated legislation committee, where the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, 
Lynne Featherstone,, a Liberal Democrat member of the Coalition Government, 
introduced and discussed the remedial order. Her view of the Court’s decision was 
more upbeat:  
We clearly believe that it was a correct judgment and, as the Government, we comply 
with Supreme Court judgments … We do not believe that a public review is needed—
the ruling was quite clear and unequivocal, and we have responded.81  
The language of compliance here, also found in other relevant portions of Hansard, 
implies the existence of an obligation. Furthermore, when the remedial order was 
introduced in the Lords a month later by Baroness Stowell of Beeston, a Conservative 
peer, she stated the following: 
Our constitutional arrangements are such that when the highest court of the land 
identifies an incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
Government of the day, whoever is in power, take remedial action. This is for various 
reasons, not the least of which is to ensure that the Government are not left vulnerable 
to further legal proceedings, potentially involving millions of pounds of taxpayers’ 
money … The Government were disappointed with the UK Supreme Court’s ruling, 
but we take our responsibility to uphold the law seriously, and that includes human 
rights law. 82 
This is presently where matters lie. It is not possible to conclude that there is a 
constitutional convention that there should be a legislative amendment as a reply to a 
                                                 
79 HC Deb 16 February 2011, vol 523, col 963. 
80 HC Deb 16 February 2011, vol 523, col 961. 
81 HC Deb 19 June 2012, vol 546, col 10 (Eight Delegated Legislation Committee, Draft Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 (Notification Requirements) (England and Wales) Regulations 2012). 
82 HL Deb 5 July 2012, vol 738, cols 875, 886. 
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declaration of incompatibility; however, evidence is mounting that one is perceived 
by the Government and some legislators to exist. Of course, conventions can change 
and there are furthermore the deeper questions of whether any purported convention 
would require legislative amendment or only good faith engagement with the issue, 
and whether the convention only applies to declarations of incompatibility made by 
the Supreme Court or to any final declaration of incompatibility decision (recalling 
that 14 out of 20 final declarations have issued from lower courts). Proper discussion 
of such matters must be addressed on another day. 
Conclusion 
The HRA is a key constitutional statute in the UK and has created a new and exciting 
period in law and politics. This chapter has explored the feature of that system that is 
most novel in comparative perspective, namely, the ability to declare primary 
legislation incompatible with human rights without legally affecting its validity or 
continuing operation. I sought to elaborate upon some of the distinctive aspects of the 
UK system, drawing a sometimes sharper contrast between it and foreign systems 
than is sometimes noticed. 
A set of such contrasts was examined in the discussion of the distinctiveness 
of the HRA. I found there that delay, when combined with the absence of retroactive 
relief, damages or restitution, interim relief and the constitutional infirmity of the 
HRA itself, amounted to significant differences between the HRA and other systems, 
including that of Canada. In the subsequent section, I concluded that the declaratory 
nature of the power under the HRA did not appear to prompt courts to be any more 
assertive in their findings of non-compliance with the Convention. By international 
comparison, they tend rather to be on the cautious side in terms of numbers of 
declarations issued and also with the intrusiveness of the individual judgments they 
have given. The portrait suggests a non-activist judiciary, though nothing there 
supports the view that they have not done their job under the HRA. These are not akin 




 As to the question of whether the experience under the HRA has promoted 
deliberative democracy, I noted that there is little evidence that the Government and 
Parliament feel dominated by judges under the HRA, and section 4 declarations are 
not a significant issue for them. The evidence instead supports a view of collaboration 
and divided responsibilities, with courts adjudicating cases and setting out findings on 
narrow issues, while the Government and Parliament work from these conclusions to 
refashion policy accordingly. Where there has been serious tension (eg, after the 
Anderson case and the Thompson case), the Government fought back by presenting to 
Parliament a policy that was different in only small ways from the original policy. 
Indeed, the responses to Anderson and Belmarsh may well have been regressive if we 
consider the matter in utilitarian terms.  
At the same time, most of the cases raised issues that Parliament had not 
considered in great depth (where there was an absence of legislative focus) and about 
which it often had no strong feelings. Since most cases were taken by marginalised 
groups, there is evidence of enhanced deliberative input, in the sense of ensuring that 
the needs of people who have less voice are properly taken into account in public 
decision-making. I further found that whole act responses and remedial orders were 
better than tacking responses, which make scant room for proper scrutiny of the 
implications of remedial measures. I lastly presented evidence that tends to support 
the view, though is ultimately inconclusive, that there exists a constitutional 
convention of responding to section 4 declarations of incompatibility. The 
Government and many parliamentarians do appear to feel obligated to respond to a 
section 4 declaration, at least so long as the HRA is in force. This appears to be proper 
constitutional policy, though there is room for considerable further analysis of this 
point. 
One final point has not yet been given sufficient emphasis: the quality of much 
of these parliamentary debates is extremely impressive and not just (or even 
primarily) in the Lords. The popular picture of parliamentarians as crude rent-seekers 
is belied by the record here. The following comment by Mr Christopher Leslie 
(Labour), concluding the debate prior to the vote on the second reading of the Gender 
Recognition Bill, is more characteristic of the UK Parliament:  
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I believe that the test of a civilised society is its approach to minorities and the respect 
that we have for their rights. Transsexual people face obstacles and legal problems on 
a day-to-day basis, quite unnecessarily. They have human rights that need defending, 
and freedoms that deserve respect. The Bill will right a wrong that currently exists, 
and I commend it to the House.83 
The vote that followed immediately was 336 in favour, with 26 against. While there is 
important room for improvement, the record tends on the whole to demonstrate in no 
small way the virtues of a parliament that takes rights seriously, working for the most 
part in constitutional harmony with its colleagues on the bench. 
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